Introduction
So far, "normal" modal logics are considered in many papers. In these logics the rule of necessitation (if |-A, then h QA) is permitted. Philosophically speaking, it means that what is assertoric is what is necessary. For example, if it rains today, then it necessarily rains. But it seems that this necessitarian world view is different from our ordinary one. Hence in order to consider modal logics which are akin to our world view, we had better do the non-normal modal logics.
To begin with, we take the intuitionistic logic as a basic logic, and we will consider the non-normal modal logics on it. Moreover we will evaluate the modal formulas in terms of interval semantics mentioned below.
It seems that this procedure gives rather weak modal logics and that they are akin to our ordinary world view.
Mathematically speaking, to consider the epistemic logics on the intuitionistic logic corresponds to this procedure. So, in this paper, we will consider the intuitionistic epistemic systems, in which no formulas of the form QA are provable. Trying to develop semantics for these systems, a complication arises. Every formula of the form QA is not provable in these systems. Especially Q(p^p) is not valid if we could have the completeness theorems in our semantics. But in usual semantics for modal logic, QA is said to be true at a world x in W if and only if A is true at every world y in W such that xRy. Accordingly, if D(p->p) is not valid in this semantics, then p-^p is not valid at some world. However p->p is a tautology, it must be true at every world. In order to overcome this difficulty, S. A. Kripke has developed a new model structure in [7] , which includes one more set whose every member called normal. Namely he divided the set of worlds into two disjoint subsets of normal and non-normal worlds.
Further in [6] he has considered the intuitionistic logic and its semantics with the idea of a model structure.
Recently, I. L. Humberstone ([5] ) and P. Roper ([8] ) have developed a different semantics, called "interval semantics", from Kripke's one essentially, although these structures are alike. In this semantics the truth of a formula is evaluated not at a moment but at an interval. For example, if a formula A is true at an interval x, then it is true at every subinterval of x.
In this paper, we will show the completeness theorems for some intuitionistic epistemic logics (IE, IE2, IE3, IET, and IE4) in terms of interval semantics which is a fusion of Kripke's non-normal and intuitionistic structures. L. F. Goble has studied these logics in [3] , but he used an axiom DAV~~OA, which is somewhat unfaithful to the spirit of the intuitionistic enterprise. Here we do not use this axiom.
Further, we refer to the decidabilities of these systems.
§ L Formal Systems and Semantics
It is supposed that these systems (IE, IE2, IE3, IET, and IE4) are expressed in a language with propositional variables p, q, r, etc., the usual truth-functional connectives A (conjunction), V (disjunction), -> (implication), ~1 (negation), and the modal operator L] (necessity), governed by the usual grammatical rules. Since we are working with intuitionistic systems, we suppose that A> V> -», ~~~1, and The structure <W, N, c ? R) is called a frame, where W is a nonempty set, N is a subset of W, c is a reflexive and transitive relation on W satisfying the property: if xeN and yC x then yeN, and R is also a relation on W satisfying the following property: persistent for future i.e. if xRy and z^y then xRz. Every element of N is called normal.
Let P be a set of propositional variables and V be a function from PxW to the set of truth-values {0, 1} such that V(p, x) = 1 and yC x imply V(p, y)=l.
Then the structure <W, N, c, R ? V> is called a model on the frame <W, N, C ? R) o By adding further conditions to the frame we obtain some models corresponding to these systems.
We now define the truth of a formula A at xeW in a model Snj = <W, N, C 5 R 3 V> by recursive definition on the length of A as follows :
SKt= x~~l A iff for every y such that yC= x not 3Kf= y A(3Kt£ y A) (3) SK|= X AAB iff 3Kt= x A and SKN X B ( 4 ) Wl |= X A VB iff 9K (= X A or 2K |= X B (5) SK[= X A->B iff for every yC x if 3K^yA then (6) 5DZ|= X QA iff xeN and for every yC x and z such that yRz, 2Kf= z A.
When 2K |= X A, we say that A is true at x in a model 3K. A is said to be valid when A is true at any x^W for every model
Let L be one of systems of IE, IE2, IE3, IET, and IE4. We list the frame conditions of these systems :
(IE2) R is reflexive on N (IE3) if xRy, yRz, and yeN, then xRz (IET) if xeN and xRy, then yeN (IE4) (IE3) and (IET).
Now we define L-frame: when L is IE, an IE-frame is the same one as defined above. An IE2 (IE3, IET, IE4) -frame is a frame with the condition (IE2) ((IE3), (IET), (IE4)). An L-model means a model on an L-frame.
Our first main theorem is that A is provable in L if and only if A is L-valid, where we say that A is L-valid when A is true at any element of every L-model. We will show this in the next section. § 2. Completeness of IE First we mention the soundness part. Here we consider only IE, so L means IE.
Proof. We have to show that the axioms of L are valid and that rules preserve the validity. We only show that R.2 preserves the validity.
Suppose
There is a counter model 9K = <W, N, c ? R ? V> for DA-^DB and xeW such that 2R|£ x nA->nB-Then there is a yC x such that 3K|= y nA and SKj^yj^jB by truth definition. Since y^N, there are z^y and u such that zRu and 3K|£ U B. By 3K^y[UA, we have 3Kt= u A and 2K|£ u A-» B. But this implies that A->B is not true at u in 3JJ, so A->B is not valid. This contradicts the assumption. Therefore the rule R.2 preserves the validity.
Next we have to show the completeness part, but before doing so we prepare some definitions and lemmas.
By a theory we mean a set of formulas in L. A theory A is called a saturated theory when it satisfies the next conditions :
( 1 ) JaAAB implies J^A and (2) //E)AVB implies JaA or (3) J|-A implies Z/3A ( 4 ) J is consistent.
It is easy to show that any saturated theory A is closed under R.I: if J3A and J^A^B, then J^B.
We have a powerful method for showing the completeness theorem. By a canonical model for L, we mean a structure <W L5 N L , C L? R L9 V L > where W L is the set of all saturated theories of L ? N L is the subset of W L whose every member has at least a sort of formula GA for some A.
For any x, y^W L , we define C L , R L , and V L as follows: We show the fundamental properties with respect to the canonical model. They are useful to show the completeness part. 
Proof.
Suppose JhDB for some B.
Since [-B-»(p-»p), ). Thus we have
Lemma 5. L^^ 3K L = <W L , N L , C L , R L? V L > be a canonical model for L. Then for every xeW L and formula A of L, 2R L l=xA iff A ex.
Proof, (by induction on the length of A)
We only show the cases of ~~1B and of For "IB, suppose that 3K L f= x nB but ~lB$x. Then x(f~lB, i.e. xU {B} is consistent. There is a saturated theory y such that yDxU {B} by lemma 2. Clearly y^Lx and Bey. When y^Lx, the assumption and I. H. (induction hypothesis) yield B$y. This contradicts the fact that Bey. Therefore ~lBex.
Conversely, suppose ~lBex. For every y such that y^Lx 5 we have ~lBey. Since y is consistent, B$y. This yields SK L |= x~~l B e For OB, suppose that SKL^xCB but QB$x. Since x is normal, there is a formula C such that GCex. By lemma 4 we have {D|xhD(p->p)->DD} = {D xhDD}. Let y be {DIxhDD}. Simple calculus and the rule R.2 yield y If B. From lemma 2, there is a saturated theory u such that uDy but u$B. Clearly xR L u. This implies SP^LJ^xQB, and it contradicts our assumption.
Conversely, suppose QBex. It is clear that xeN L and QBey for every y and z such that y^Lx and yR L z. This indicates Bez. Since xR L y and yR L z, y h nCp~>p)~>DA and zhA i.e. zBA. We have {A |x h n(p~^p) "^CHAj Cz. This means xR L z.
Therefore the completeness theorem for IE3 can be proved similarly.
For IET, it can be proved that the further condition (IET) is satisfied by the canonical model for IET. The condition means that xeN L and xR L y imply yeN L .
Suppose that xeN L and xR L y. We have x h DCp~>p)~>Dn(p~>p) by the axiom schema A. 4. By simple calculus we have [JCp->p) GEy and yeN L .
The completeness theorem for IET holds. We can prove the completeness theorem for IE4 similarly.
In the next section, we will show that IE (IE2, IET, IE4) has the finite model property. We use the method called "filtration". §4.
Filtration Method
We apply the filtration method to any IE-model, which is a basic argument of our consideration.
Let 3K = <W ? N, C, R, V> be an IE-model, and 0 be the set of formulas closed under subformulas. We define a filtration model HJJ* of 3K through 0.
For every x, yeW, we define x=y when SKt= x A iff 9K[= y A for every formula A in 0.
[x] = {y<EW x=y} is an equivalence class of x under = , and we set Let 3K* be the structure <W*, N*, c* 5 R% V*>, which is called a filtration of 2W through 0.
It is evident that these definitions are well-defined. Clearly these definitions indicate that 9K* is indeed a model for IE.
We mention an interesting fact, which reflects the adequency of interval semantics. We will show that IE (IE2, IET, IE4 ) has the finite model property. In order to do so, we need the next lemma. This lemma is completely proved.
From this lemma we can prove that the IE-system has the finite model property.
Theorem 8. The IE-system has the finite model property.
Proof. If (f IE A, then we have SK(^XA for a counter IE-model SK and an xeW. Let 0 be the set of all subformulas of A. Let m* be the filtration of SK through 0. Since 0 is finite, 2K* is a finite model. Then by lemma 7 we have SK* |£ [X] A. This means that the IE-system has the finite model property.
For the IE2-system, we have to check that the filtration Sft* of 9K through 0 satisfies the frame condition (IE2) when Sft is a model for IE2. This is clear.
Hence we have :
Theorem 9. The IE2-system has the finite model property. This definition of R' is well-defined and satisfies the frame condition (IET). By simple calculus, SK' = <W*, N*, c* 9 R', V*> will be an lET-model.
In order to show that SK' satisfies lemma 7 instead of SK*, we have to indicate that lemma 7 as to IET holds for the case of QAe 0.
For OA, suppose that SK'Nc^DA but 3Kt£ This contradicts our assumption. Therefore lemma 7 as to IET also holds for 2ft'. Hence we have:
Theorem 10. The lET-system has the finite model property.
As for the IE4-system, we take R' instead of R*. It is easy to show that aK' = <W*, N*, c* 5 R', V*> is an IE4-model when M = <W, N, c, R, V> is one.
Lemma 7 as to IE4 holds for W.
Thus we have :
Theorem 11. The IE4:-system has the finite model property.
Unfortunately, I can not say at present whether IE3 has the finite model property.
